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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the important determinants of capital structure in the Indonesian Companies. Objectives: 
This study extends the empirical works on the determinants of capital structure, taking all the relevant 
independent variables as determinants; it sheds new light on the relationship between business risk and leverage. 
Approach: This paper using Generalized Methods of Moment to analyze capital structure and market power, 
and profitability in relationships. Capital structure and market power, as measured by Tobin's Q, are shown to 
have a cubic relationship, due to the complex interaction of market conditions, agency problems and bankruptcy 
costs. Result: The study finds a saucer-shaped relation between capital structure and profitability. The negative 
relationship between debt ratio and the size of shareholding means that more diffused ownership results in lower 
leverage, which supports the agency hypothesis. The current results indicate a significant positive relationship of 
tangibility (FA/A ratio) with debt ratio, which vindicates the trade-off theory that postulates a positive 
correlation between debt ratio and tangibility since fixed assets act as collateral in debt issues. Implication: this 
study implying for academics can develop capital structure theory, for practitioner as the reference for business 
decision-making, especially market structure. 
Keywords: Capital structure; market structure; profitability; and expenditure 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Companies have purpose for long term and short term, in short Term Company how get the maximum 
profit and for the long term how to increase firm value as well as market structure. The relationship between 
capital structure and market structure has been the subject of considerable debate, both theoretically and in 
empirical research. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure 
for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm's value. 
Correlation and relationship issue between industry membership and capital structure has received 
considerable attention. In their review of the capital structure literature, Harris and Raviv (1991) noted that it is 
generally accepted that firms in a given industry will have similar leverage ratios while leverage ratios vary 
across industries. Schwartz and Aronson (1967) documented a relationship between industry and capital 
structure in five industries. 
Statement from Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) about capital structure irrelevance and the tax shield 
advantage paved the way for the development of alternative theories and a series of empirical research initiatives 
on capital structure. The alternative theories include the tradeoff theory, the pecking order/asymmetric 
information theory and the agency theory. All these theories have been subjected to extensive empirical testing 
in the context of developed countries, particularly the United States (US) (see Harris & Raviv 1991 for a 
review). A few studies report on international comparisons of capital structure determinants (Rajan & Zingales 
1995; Wald 1999); and there are some studies that provide evidence on the capital structure determinants from 
the emerging markets of South-East Asia (Annuar & Shamsher 1993; Ariff 1998; Pandey, Chotigeat & Ranjit 
2000; Pandey 2001). The recent focus of corporate finance empirical literature has been to identify some 
'stylized' factors that determine capital structure. 
In their seminal article, Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963) demonstrate that, in a frictionless world, 
financial leverage is unrelated to firm value, but in a world with tax-deductible interest payments, firm value and 
capital structure are positively related. Miller (1977) added personal taxes to the analysis and demonstrated that 
optimal debt usage occurs on a macro-level, but it does not exist at the firm level. Interest deductibility at the 
firm level is offset at the investor level. 
With relatively little evidence available on the interaction between capital structure and product market 
structure, some researchers have recently started investigating this relationship. Brander and Lewis (1986), 
Maksimovic (1988), Ravid (1988) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) variously offer a theoretical framework for 
the linkage between capital structure and market structure. On a broader front, Harris and Raviv (1991) and 
Phillips (1995) provide surveys of both the theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between capital 
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structure and market structure, while studies in the US by Krishnaswamy, Mangla and Rathinasamy (1992), 
Chevalier (1993) and Phillips (1995) investigate the empirical relationship between capital structure and market 
structure.  
In a recent study, Rathinasamy, Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) examine this issue in an 
international context using data from forty-seven countries. All these studies establish a linear relationship, either 
positive or negative, between capital structure and market structure. Differing from the linear theory, this paper 
argues that the relationship between capital structure and market structure is cubic. It also shows that the relation 
of profitability with capital structure is U-shaped or saucer-shaped. The results of the present empirical work 
vindicate these predictions. To their knowledge, the authors of this work are the first to uncover the cubic 
relationship between capital structure and market structure, and the saucer-shaped relationship between capital 
structure and profitability. It is also possible that they are the first to carry out the empirical work on the 
relationship between capital structure and market structure using data from the emerging Indonesian market. 
Other researchers have added imperfections, such as bankruptcy costs (Baxter, 1967; Stiglitz, 1972; 
Kraus and Lichtenberger, 1973; and Kim, 1978), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and gains from 
leverage-induced tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), to the analysis and have maintained that an optimal 
capital structure may exist. Empirical work by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) and 
Titman and Wessells (1985) largely supports bankruptcy costs or agency costs as partial determinants of 
leverage and of optimal capital structure. 
Our study extends the empirical works on the determinants of capital structure, taking all the relevant 
independent variables as determinants, it sheds new light on the relationship between business risk and leverage. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Following a review of the literature, the 
theoretical framework of the study is presented, after which there is a description of the data and research 
methodology. The results of the statistical analyses are then reported, and the paper ends with a summary of the 
main conclusions. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Market structure is shown to affect capital structure by influencing the Competitive behavior and 
strategies of firms. Firms In an oligopolistic market will follow the strategy of maximizing their output in 
favorable economic Conditions to optimize profitability (brander & lewis 1986). The theory also holds in 
unfavorable economic Conditions; firms would take a cut in production and reduce their profitability. 
Shareholders, though, while enjoying increased wealth in good periods, tend to ignore a decline in profitability in 
bad times. This is due To the fact that unfavorable consequences are passed onto lenders because of 
shareholders' limited liability Status. Therefore, the oligopolistic firms, in contrast To firms in competitive 
markets, would employ higher Levels of debt to produce more when opportunities to earn higher profits arise. 
The implied prediction of the Output maximization hypothesis is that capital structure And market structure have 
a positive relationship. 
Much of the previous empirical work on the determinants of borrowing decisions of firms has tended to 
concentrate on the factors predicted by the static trade-off theory of capital structure, which is based on a trade-
off between the tax advantages of debt financing and the costs of financial distress. As discussed in Myers 
(1984), the static trade-off theory implies that the actual debt ratio reverts towards a target or optimum, and it 
predicts a cross sectional relation between debt ratios and asset risk, size, profitability, tax status and asset type. 
The results of the empirical literature confirm some of these predictions in that firms in the same industry, facing 
similar conditions, risk characteristics and tax status, have similar leverage ratios. Moreover, on balance the 
evidence from these studies lends support to the negative impact of business risk on corporate borrowing 
decisions. However, there are conflicting conclusions on the impact of other firm specific variables. 
From Agency costs theory statement, the theory supports the use of high debt, and it is consistent with the 
prediction of the output maximization hypothesis. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the shareholders-
lenders conflict has the effect of shifting risk from shareholders and of appropriating wealth in their favor as they 
take on risky investment projects (asset substitution). Hence, shareholders, and managers as their agents, are 
prompted to take on more borrowing to finance risky projects. Lenders receive interest and principal if projects 
succeed, and shareholders appropriate the residual income; however, it is the lender who incurs the loss if the 
project fails. 
In the corporate finance, capital structure increases the chances of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
Firms face costs of financial distress when they are unable to service debt. They will have high debt ratios if 
these costs are zero or trivial (Scott 1976; Kim 1978). Since costs of financial distress are non-trivial and highly 
leveraged firms can actually go bankrupt, firms with a high probability of bankruptcy will have a low debt ratio. 
The chances of bankruptcy for firms with large reserve funds are relatively less, but unleveraged firms with high 
profitability and large reserve funds have a great competitive advantage. These firms with 'deep purses' may not 
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only survive but they also gain by driving their rival firms into bankruptcy (Brander & Lewis 1986; Bolton & 
Scharfstein 1990).  
Firms in this situation can follow a policy of aggressive production and predatory price cutting to 
eliminate their rivals by forcing them into financial distress. This strategy pays off, particularly when external 
funding is not available to the firms that are the target of the predatory price behavior. The implication of this 
model is that the unleveraged firm with deep purses (high profitability and reserve funds) has the incentive to 
increase their output in order to drive their competitors into bankruptcy. Empirically, a negative relationship can 
be predicted between capital structure and market structure. 
Asymmetric information theory or the pecking order predict a negative relationship between capital 
structure and market power. Myers (1977) provides a model under which debt causes under-investment (asset 
substitution). In this scenario, firms reject those profitable, low-risk investment projects that have the possibility 
of passing on benefits from shareholders to lenders. Furthermore, internal financing is cheaper than external debt 
or equity financing due to asymmetric information. Higher debt makes higher output costly for a leveraged firm. 
In a competitive market, unleveraged or low-leveraged rival firms will intensify competition by increasing their 
output and/or lowering prices. If the leveraged firms continue borrowing to meet the competition, they may face 
financial distress and bankruptcy. 
Study of Krishnaswamy, Mangla and Rathinasamy (1992) find a positive relationship between debt and 
market structure, measured by the Lerner index. Chevalier (1993) provides evidence in support of a negative 
relationship between capital structure and market structure. This result is consistent with bankruptcy costs or the 
asymmetric information/pecking order hypotheses. Phillips (1995), using price and quantity data for market 
structure, finds a positive link between capital structure and market structure, consistent with the output and 
limited liability effect model. In a study of international firms from forty-nine countries, Rathinasamy, 
Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) also report a positive relationship between capital structure, measured 
by total debt ratio (TDR); and long-term ratio and market structure, measured by Tobin's Q. 
Profitability is an important independent variable that has an influence on capital structure. As per the 
asymmetric information hypothesis of Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984), firms, irrespective of their 
market power, would depend on internally generated funds for their expansion since external funds involve 
higher costs. This suggests a negative relationship between capital structure and profitability, which results of 
empirical studies support (Kester 1986; Friend & Lang 1988; Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1995; 
Michaelas, Chittenden & Poutziouris 1999). But the alternative interest/tax shield hypothesis (Modigliani & 
Miller 1963) predicts a positive relationship between capital structure and profitability. 
In adverse market conditions, their limited liability status provides protection to shareholders against the 
risk-taking production decision and it is the lenders that would suffer. Thus, a firm's debt level will increase as it 
gains market power reflected in Q. On the other hand, as debt increases, there are significant costs in terms of 
increased probability of bankruptcy and financial distress. This cost would be accentuated by the behavior of no-
debt or low-debt firms with 'deep purses'. They would resort to predatory price behavior and lead their rivals to 
bankruptcy. This argument suggests a negative relationship between capital structure and Q. These two opposing 
effects point to the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between capital structure and market power (Pandey, 
2004). 
As a firm starts gaming market dominance, it will increase debt to increase its production and income; 
that is, as firms' market power increases, they employ more debt to pursue their output maximization strategy. 
This attracts rival firms to intensify competition by cutting price and/or output. At the intermediate level of 
market dominance when competition intensifies through price cutting, higher costs of debt squeeze the 
profitability of highly leveraged firms, increasing their chances of financial distress and bankruptcy. Leveraged 
firms react by reducing debt or by increasing production through improved assets utilization. However, after 
consolidating their position, firms at a higher level of market dominance once again leverage the use of debt to 
expand their production. 
Furthermore, Firms in a position of strong profitability and high market dominance that has reserve funds 
can adopt a high-risk production strategy and use more debt. Thus, a cubic relationship can be predicted between 
capital structure and market power. The relationship between capital structure and risk have been describe by 
Myers (1984) that points out the lack of sufficient evidence for a relationship between capital structure and risk. 
According to the trade-off theory, a higher debt ratio increases the probability of financial distress. With positive 
financial distress/bankruptcy costs, the risk affects a firm's debt ratio. Ross (1985) demonstrates a theoretical 
inverse relation between cash flow beta and financial leverage. A theoretically and empirically sound 
measurement of risk is the firm's unleveraged beta. Chung (1989) shows that the relationship between capital 
structure and the unleveraged beta is negative. Thus, a negative relationship can be predicted between leverage 
and risk; however, it is shown that for a negative relationship between risk and leverage, bankruptcy costs should 
be quite large (Castanias 1983; Bradley, Jarrell & Kim 1984). 
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Gosh et al. (2000) using development expenditure and advertising expenditure as determinant of capital 
structure. Gosh et al. (2000) confirm the usefulness of taking growth of assets, fixed asset ratio, R & D  
expenditure and advertising expenditure as the determinants of capital structure. At the same time, our results 
show that the relationship between business risk and leverage is quadratic, and it is first increasing and then 
decreasing — a relationship more close to the traditional theory and contradicts the results obtained by Kale, 
Noe and Ramirez (1991). But the problem of omitted variables remains as the known determinants 'explain' a 
very small percentage of the variation in capital structure. 
Something about Bankruptcy has argued by Rajan & Zingales (1995) that large firms are likely to be 
more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. They are also expected to incur lower direct costs in issuing debt. 
Thus, large firms are expected to employ a higher amount of debt than small firms. The empirical evidence is 
mixed. A large number of studies find a significant positive relationship between size and debt ratio (Lasfer 
1995; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Barclay & Smith 1996; Berger, Ofek & Yermack 1997). Kester (1986) and 
Remmers et al. (1974) find no significant effect of size on capital structure. 
Base on several argue above, tangible assets act as collateral and provide security to lenders in the event 
of financial distress. Collaterally also protects lenders from the moral hazard problem caused by the 
shareholders-lenders conflict (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Thus, firms with higher tangible assets are expected to 
have a high level of debt. As regards the empirical evidence, some studies report a significant positive 
relationship between tangibility and total debt (Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. Sample 
Financial data and capital market data are collected for all firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 
financial report database of Indonesia Stock Exchange and database of IDX Corners of Universitas Brawijaya. 
The period’s coverage is over the years 2009-2011. Companies with missing data are excluded from the study. 
The study also excludes: 
(1) The financial and securities sector companies, as their financial characteristics and use of leverage are 
substantially different from other companies.  
(2) Companies with zero sales and negative equity are also omitted.  
After eliminating outliers, the sample size is 197 companies for each period. The data of those companies 
is adjusted, which changes their financial year. Such changes result in one year with missing data and the 
subsequent year's data of more than twelve months. The subsequent year's data is annualized first, and then the 
missing data is substituted by the mean value. 
B. Measures 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the definition of capital structure would depend on the objective of 
the analysis. For example, for agency problem-related studies, capital structure may be measured by total debt-
to-firm value ratio. Debt can be divided into its various components, and numerator and denominator can be 
measured in book value and market value terms. This study defines the dependent variable—capital structure—
as total debt-to-assets (or debt-to-capital employed); it is the measure of capital structure most often used in 
empirical studies. Total debt includes interest-bearing long-term and short-term debt. Assets include fixed assets 
and those current assets that are financed by debt. In an accounting sense, this is equivalent to capital employed, 
including shareholders' funds (equity) and short-and long-term debt. 
The theoretical definition of Q is the ratio of market value of the firm to replacement cost of assets. It is 
not easy to get replacement cost data in developing countries. Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that Q could be 
effectively defined as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of long-term debt and net current 
assets (current assets minus current liabilities) divided by the book value of equity, long-term debt and net 
current assets. Like Rathinasamy, Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000), the current study uses this 
measurement. 
Pandey (2004) argue his studies so far have predicted a linear relationship between capital structure and 
market power. It is argued here that this relationship could be a cubic relationship, the reasons being as follows. 
A firm in an oligopolistic condition sustains its aggressive production and high-income strategy by employing 
higher level of debt. Shareholders of the firm gain in terms of increased wealth.  
C. Data Analysis 
The estimation model uses panel data. Panel data, unlike cross-section data, allow controlling for 
unobservable heterogeneity through individual (firm) effect (ty). Dummies for time variables are also included to 
measure temporal effect. This helps in controlling the effect of macroeconomic variables on capital structure. 
Thus, the study uses a two-way, fixed-effect model. The fixed-effect model controls for unobservable 
heterogeneity; but provides biased results if endogenous variables are included. To resolve this problem, this 
study estimates the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which controls the problem of 
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endogeneity by using instrument variables. Furthermore, to eliminate individual effect, the study uses the cross-
section first differences of variables in the model estimation. 
The estimation equation follows: 
TRDit=β0+β1Qit+β2Q2it+β3Q3it+β4(EBIT/A)it+β5(EBIT/A)2it+β6(EBIT/A)3it+β7LnRDit +β8LnADVit 
+λ1GAit+ λ2BETAit+ λ3LnAit+ λ4LnNSHit+ λ5FA/Ait+eit 
Total debt-to-asset ratio (TDR) at book value is the dependent variable. Independent variables include 
Tobin's Q, profitability, growth, systematic risk, size, ownership (number of shares) and tangibility. Tobin's Q is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of long-term debt and net current assets 
(current assets minus current liabilities) divided by the book value equity, long-term debt and net current assets. 
R & D expenditure (LnRD) measured as total cost or expenditure for Research and Development activity for 
increasing product quality. Advertising expenditure (LnADV) measured as total cost or expensive for Promotion 
activity for increasing product sales. Growth (GA) is measured as one plus annual change in assets. Profitability 
is defined as earnings before interest and taxes, divided by assets or capital (EBIT/A). Systematic risk is 
measured by unleveraged or asset beta.  
First, the equity beta for each firm is calculated using the weekly share price data. The calculated equity 
beta for each company is unleveraged for its level of leverage. In the equation, this is referred to as BETAA. Size 
is measured as the natural log of assets (LnA). Ownership is measured by the natural log of number of 
outstanding shares (LnNSH). It is assumed that a larger number of shares imply diffused ownership. Tangibility 
is defined as fixed assets divided by assets (FA/A). 
 
IV. RESULT 
Table 1 (provides means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables for each 
year from 2009 to 2011 and for the period 2009-2011. The average TDR for the period 2009-2011 is 24,91%. 
However, TDR has been steadily increasing over years, ranging from 24% in 2009 to 25% in 2011. 
The Q ratio has shown fluctuations during 2009-2011. It was lower in 2009-2010, corresponding with the 
financial and stock market crisis in Indonesia. Research and Development expenditure has shown fluctuate 
during 2009-2010. Advertising expenditure also increases significantly in the last three years. Assets growth was 
quite high for year from 2009-2011. Profitability also increases significantly in the last three years. Other 
variables was increase for year from 2009-2011. 
Table 1. Summary Statistic Descriptive 
2009 2010 2011 Total 09-11 
TDR Means  0.2472  0.2491  0.2510 0.2491  
Standard Deviation   0.1756  0.1769  0.1782 0.1769  
Tobin's Q Means  3.2654  3.2901  3.3149 3.2901  
Standard Deviation   3.0978  3.1212  3.1447 3.1212  
EBIT/A Means  0.2110  0.2126  0.2142 0.2126  
Standard Deviation   0.1988  0.2003  0.2018 0.2003  
LnRD Means 1.1474  1.0789  2.1334  1.4532  
 
Standard Deviation  0.9876  0.7688  0.8595  0.8720  
LnADV Means 1.9879  2.1442  2.3005  2.1442  
 
Standard Deviation  1.0912  0.9577  0.8242  0.9577  
Growth Means  0.4758  0.4693  0.4728 0.4693  
Standard Deviation   0.7684  0.7742  0.7800 0.7742  
BETTA Means  1.1244  1.1328  1.1414 1.1329  
Standard Deviation   0.4565  0.4600  0.4635 0.4600  
Ln Aset Means  3.4357  3.4616  3.4878 3.4617  
Standard Deviation   0.8988  0.9056  0.9124 0.9056  
LnNSH Means  7.9877  8.0480  8.1087 8.0481  
Standard Deviation   2.3457  2.3634  2.3812 2.3634  
FA/A Means  0.5977  0.6022  0.6067 0.6022  
Standard Deviation  0.3954  0.3984  0.4014 0.3984  
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Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for the pooled sample of 591 firms/years observations. The study 
finds that size (LnA) and Q ratio have a significant positive relationship with TDR , while risk (unleveraged or 
asset beta, BETAA) and profitability (EBITA/A) have a significant negative relationship. Other significant 
relationships exist between risk and size and size and ownership (LnNSH). The negative relationship between 
risk and size implies that the large firms, being more diversified, have lower systematic risk. The positive 
relationship between size and ownership indicates that the large-sized Indonesian firms have more diffused 
ownership. 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
  
TDR Q EBIT/A 
LnR
D 
LnAD
V 
Grow
th Beta LnA 
LnNS
H 
FA/
A 
TDR 1.0000                   
Q 0.2987 1.0000                 
EBIT
/A 
–
0.263
4 
0.1647 1.0000     
          
LnR
D 
0.354
3 0.1623 
–
0.004
5 
1.000
0   
          
LnA
DV 
–
0.546
7 
0.1866 
–
0.006
5 
0.121
1 
1.000
0 
          
Grow
th 
–
0.326
5 
0.0376 0.1675 
0.223
1 
0.005
6 
1.000
0 
        
Betaa 
–
0.523
6 
0.0654 0.0966 
–
0.004
9 
–
0.002
4 
0.005
7 
1.000
0 
      
LnA 
–
0.246
7 
–
0.1558 
–
0.153
4 
–
0.232
2 
–
0.008
3 
0.075
4 
–
0.256
5 
1.000
0 
    
LnN
SH 
0.156
7 
–
0.0354 
–
0.086
3 
–
0.123
2 
–
0.001
2 
–
0.064
2 
–
0.167
6 
0.945
4 
1.000
0 
  
FA/A 
–
0.026
6 
–
0.0575 
0.035
8 
–
0.002
3 
–
0.002
1 
–
0.465
2 
–
0.073
6 
–
0.073
5 
–
0.345
4 
1.00
00 
 
Table 3 presents results of the GMM estimation. The main concern here is to test the specification about 
the relationship between capital structure (TDR) and market structure (or power) (Q ratio). As predicted, the 
study finds that the coefficients of variables Q and Q are positive and the coefficient of Q2 is negative. All these 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level of significance, which supports a cubic specification for the capital 
structure - market structure relationship for Indonesian firms. This evidence is interpreted as consistent with the 
economic theory of output maximization and the finance theories of agency costs and bankruptcy costs. For a 
given initial range of Q ratio, any increase in this ratio leads firms to increase output and take more risk to 
maximize shareholders' wealth. This causes rivalry in the market and competition intensifies, particularly from 
unleveraged firms. The fear of bankruptcy and loss of investment and profitability obliges leveraged firms to 
reduce debt. Hence, for some intermediate range of Q the competition forces leveraged firms to lessen debt. 
Finally, for well-established, profitable firms with a very high Q ratio and low probability of financial distress 
and bankruptcy, the output maximization seems to dominate the relationship between capital structure and the Q 
ratio. 
The study also finds expected signs of the coefficients of profitability variables, (EBIT/A) ,  
(EBIT/A) 2  and (EBIT/A) 3 .  The coefficients of (EBIT/A)  and (EBIT/A) 3  are, respectively, negative 
and positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The coefficient of 
(EBIT/A)2 is not statistically different from zero. Thus, these results confirm a saucer-shaped relationship 
between debt ratio and profitability. This evidence is interpreted as a trade-off between the effects of asymmetric 
information, agency costs and tax benefits. For a given initial range of profitability, any increase in this ratio 
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leads firms to internally finance their output growth and minimize their cost of financing. It is also likely that at 
relatively lower levels of profitability, firms may not have much incentive to issue debt, as other non-debt tax 
shields may be available to them.  
 
Table 3. Result of GMM Model on Panel Data 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
TDR 0.0164 8.956 0.000 
Q 0.0473 5.846 0.000 
Q
2
 –0.0346 –4.645 0.000 
Q
3 
0.0045 2.866 0.028 
(EBIT/A) –0.0265 –3.646 0.007 
(EBIT/A)
2
 0.0845 0.983 0.127 
(EBIT/A)
3
 0.3644 2.986 0.032 
LnRD 0.2112 3.453 0.009 
LnADV 0.1234 3.535 0.008 
Growth –0.0236 –3.767 0.006 
Beta –0.0212 –4.655 0.000 
LnA 0.2767 7.866 0.000 
LnNSH –0.2287 –2.789 0.030 
FA/A 0.0513 1.275 0.098 
Adjusted-R Square  :    0.654 
j-statistic  :  16.767 
N   :       591 
 
There may also exist an intermediate range of profitability where firms do not have sufficient incentive 
either to increase or decrease debt any further. Finally, firms that have higher levels of profitability can exploit 
their market power in a situation of intensifying competition by increasing their borrowings to expand their 
output. Pandey (2004) argue this strategy is also of benefit in that such firms have more profits to shield from 
taxes. Furthermore, agency costs will be higher once firms reach high levels of profitability. 
The coefficients of other control variables are also statistically significant. Consistent with the option 
model of Myers (1977),  Pandey (2004) and the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) the results 
of this study show a significant positive relationship between LnRD and debt ratio and positive relationship 
between LnADV and debt ratio. Contradict with Ghosh (2000) R & D  expenditure and advertising expenditure 
shows a significant negative relationship with capital structure in year 1982, but positive relationships in 10 
years later, years 1992 for the between LnADV and debt ratio.  However, advertising expenditure was also 
significant at the 5 percent level. The positive signs for both R & D  expenditure and advertising expenditure 
contradict with the conclusions reached by Harris and Raviv (1991). 
The results of this study show a significant negative relationship between growth and debt ratio. The 
study also finds a negative relationship between (systematic) risk and debt ratio, which is consistent with the 
trade-off theory. The positive relationship between size and debt ratio is evidence in favor of the hypotheses that 
larger firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy and the transaction costs of issuing debt is 
smaller. The negative relationship between debt ratio and the size of shareholding means that more diffused 
ownership results in lower leverage, which supports the agency hypothesis. The current results indicate a 
significant positive relationship of tangibility (FA/A ratio) with debt ratio, which vindicates the trade-off theory 
that postulates a positive correlation between debt ratio and tangibility since fixed assets act as collateral in debt 
issues. Consistent with the option model of  Pandey (2004).  
Kale, Noe and Ramirez (1991) found the relationship between business risk and leverage to be quadratic 
– first decreasing and then increasing, we have found it to be the opposite – first increasing and then decreasing. 
This conforms to the traditional theory which suggests that when risk is low, higher will be the debt level, but 
with higher risk, debt level should be lower. 
The two-way (firm and time) fixed effects model and the fixed firm effects model were also employed 
(results not reported). Consistent with the result of Pandey (2004). Both models gave results similar to the GMM 
results. The fixed firm effects model was estimated with standard and White's heteroscedasticity-consistent t-
values as well as with autocorrelation correction. For all variables, White's heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values 
were significant at the 5% level, and the autocorrelation-corrected estimates of variables also remained 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.36, 2014 
 
139 
significant and were as per prediction. Thus, the results of estimations of the fixed firm effects and the two-way 
effects models were similar to the results obtained from the more robust GMM estimation. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The above review of empirical research cited numerous studies which had documented a relationship 
between industry membership and capital structure and market structure. In this study, empirically we examines 
the relationship between capital structure and market structure using data for 197 Indonesian companies for the 
period from 2009 to 2011. The estimation method uses the GMM on panel data. The study provides new insights 
into the way in which the capital structure, measured by total debt-to-assets ratio; and market structure or power, 
measured by Tobin's Q ratio, are related. Tobin's q defined as the market value of the company divided by the 
replacement cost of capital. If Q is high, the housing market value is high relative to the cost of replacement of 
capital, and capital building and equipment will be relatively cheap to the market value of the company. 
The tendency of companies who increasingly use debt, without realizing it gradually, will lead to 
increasingly severe liability for the company to pay off the current (pay back) the debt. The results support the 
prediction that capital structure and market structure/power have a cubic relationship; that is, at the lower and 
higher ranges of Tobin's Q, firms employ higher debt; and at intermediate range, they reduce their debt. This 
study also shows a saucer-shaped relationship between capital structure and profitability because of the interplay 
of agency costs, costs of external financing and the interest/tax shield. In addition to the Q ratio and profitability, 
other independent variables are included in the estimation.  
 
REFERENCES: 
 
Annuar, M.N. & Shamsher, M. (1993). Capital structure, Capital Market Review, 1(2): 171-77.  
Ariff, M. (1998, Stock Pricing in Malaysia—Corporate Financial and Investment Management, UPM Press, 
Selangor, Malaysia.  
Barclay, M.J. & Smith, C.W. (1996). On financial architecture: leverage, maturity and priority, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 8(4): 4-17.  
__________. & Smith, C.W. (1999). The capital structure puzzle: another look at the evidence, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 12(1): 8-20.  
__________, Smith, C.W. & Watts, R.L. (1995). The determinants of corporate leverage and dividend policies, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(4): 4-(19.  
Berger, P.G., Ofek, E. 8c Yermack, D.L. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions, 
Journal of Finance, 52(4): 1411-38.  
Bolton, P. & Scharfstein, D. (1990). A theory of production based agency problems in financial contracting, 
American Economic Review, 80(1): 59-581.  
Bradley, M., Jarrell, G.A. & Kim, E.H. (1984). On the existence of optimal capital structure theory and evidence, 
Journal of Finance, 39(3): 857-78.  
Brander, J.A. & Lewis, T.R. (1986). Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect, American 
Economic Review, 76(5): 956-70.  
Castanias, R. (1983). Bankruptcy risk and optimal capital structure, Journal of Finance, 38(5): 1617-35.  
Chevalier, J.A. (1993). Capital structure and product-market competition: empirical evidence from the 
supermarket industry, American Economic Review, 85(3): 415-35.  
Chung, K.H. & Pruitt, S.W. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobins Q, Financial Management, 23(3): 70-74.  
________. (1989). Debt and risk: a technical note, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 16(5) (Winter): 
7(19-27. Chung, K.H. (1993, Asset characteristics and corporate debt policy: an empirical test, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 20(1): 83-98.  
Crutchley, C.E. & Hansen, R.S. (1989). A test of the agency theory of managerial ownership, corporate leverage, 
and corporate dividend, Financial Management, 18(4): 36—46.  
DeAngelo, H. 8c Masulis, R.W. (1980). Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 8(1): 3-29.  
Ferri, M.G. & Jones, W.H. (1979). Determinants of financial structure: a new methodological approach, Journal 
of Finance, 34(3): 631-44.  
Friend, I. & Lang, L.H.P. (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate capital 
structure, Journal of Finance, 43(2): 271-81.  
Ghosh, Arvin. Francis Cai and Wenhui Li, (2000). The Determinants of Capital Structure. American Business 
Review, June 2000: 129-132. 
Harris, M. & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure, Journal of Finance, 46(1): 297-355. 
Jensen, M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic 
Review, 76(3): 323-29.  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.36, 2014 
 
140 
Jensen, M.C. & Heckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and capital 
structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-65.  
Kale, J.R., Noe, T.H., and Ramirez, G.G., (1991). The Effect of Business Risk on Corporate Capital Structure: 
Theory and Evidence, Journal of Finance, Dec. (1991: 1693-1715. 
Kester, C.W. (1986). Capital and ownership structure: a comparison of United States and Japanese 
manufacturing corporations, Financial Management, 15(1): 5-16.  
Kim, E.H. (1978). A mean-variance theory of optimal capital structure and corporate debt capacity Journal of 
Finance, 33(1): 45-63.  
Krishnaswamy, C.R., Mangla, I. 8c Rathinasamy, R.S. (1992). An empirical analysis of the relationship between 
financial structure and market structure, Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions, 5(3): 75-88.  
Lasfer, M.A. (1995). Agency costs, taxes and debt: the UK evidence, European Financial Management, 1(3): 
265-85.  
Lindenberg, E.B. & Ross, S.A. (1981). Tobins Q ratio and industrial organization, Journal of Business, 54(1): 1-
32.  
Maksimovic, V. (1988). Capital structure in repeated oligopoly, Rand Journal of Economics, (19: 389^07.  
Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. & Poutziouris, P. (1999). Financial policy and capital structure choice in UK 
SMEs: empirical evidence from company panel data, Small Business Economics, 12: 113-30.  
Modigliani, F. & Miller, M.H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, 
American Economic Review, 48(3): 261-97.  
________________________. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction, American 
Economic Review, 53(3): 433-43.  
Myers, S.C. & Majluf, N.S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information 
that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187-221.  
________. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics, 5: 147-75. Myers, 
S.C. (1984, The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39(3): 575-92.  
Pandey, I.M. (2001). Capital structure and the firm characteristics: evidence from an emerging market, Working 
paper 2001- 10-04, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India.  
_________. (2004). Capital Structure, Profitability and Market Structure: evidence from Malaysia. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Economics & Business, Vol.8 No.2 (December 2004) 
________, Chotigeat, T. & Ranjit, M.K. (2000). Capital structure choices in an emerging capital market: case of 
Thailand, Management and Change, 4(1): 1-14.  
Phillips, G.M. (1995). Increased debt and industry markets: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37(2): 189-238.  
Rajan, R.G. & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international 
data, Journal of Finance, 50(5): 1421-60.  
Rathinasamy, R.S., Krishnaswamy, C.R. & Mantripragada, K.G. (2000). Capital structure and product market 
interaction: an international perspective, Global Business and Finance Review, 5(2): 51-63.  
Ravid, S.A. (1988). On the interactions between production and financial decisions, Financial Management, 
17(3): 87-99.  
Remmers, L., Stonehill, A., Wright, R. & Beekhuisen, T. (1974). Industry and size as debt ratio determinants in 
manufacturing internationally, Financial Management, (Summer): 24-32.  
Ross, S. (1985). Debt and taxes and uncertainty, Journal of Finance, 40(3): 637-57. Scott, J.H. (1976, A theory 
of optimal capital structure, Bell Journal of Economics, 7: 33-54.  
Titman, S. & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice, Journal of Finance, 43(1): 1-(19.  
Wald, J.K. (1999). How firm characteristics affect capital structure: an international comparison, Journal of 
Financial Research, 22(2): 161-87.  
Williamson, O.E. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance, Journal of Finance, 43(3): 567-91. 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event 
management.  The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting 
platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the 
following page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available 
online to the readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers 
other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version 
of the journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
